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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF  
AMICI CURIAE 
 
The identity and interest of Amici are set forth in the Motion for 
Leave to File that accompanies this brief.  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Our state constitution robustly protects against cruel punishment, 
State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014), and 
implicit in that protection is the continuing duty of Washington courts to 
develop article I, section 14 jurisprudence to ensure that it remains more 
protective than the Eighth Amendment. Under the Eighth Amendment, life 
without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender is constitutional 
only in the “rarest” of cases. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __, 136 
S. Ct. 718, 726, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016). As 
the Court of Appeals rightly recognized, the identification of those “rare” 
cases is not only next to impossible, but creates an unconstitutional risk of 
cruel punishment: “[i]n light of the speculative and uncertain nature of the 
Miller analysis, the Miller-fix statute creates a risk of misidentifying 
juveniles with hope of rehabilitation for those who are irretrievably 
corrupt. That is unacceptable under our State’s cruel punishment 
proscription.” State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, ¶ 61, 349 P.3d 430 
(2017), review granted, 402 P.3d 827 (2017). The Court of Appeals’ 
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adoption of a categorical bar against juvenile life without parole is both a 
necessary and logical progression of Washington’s robust protection 
against cruel punishment.  
This Court should affirm the adoption of the categorical bar against 
juvenile life without parole for two reasons, each of which is sufficient on 
its own to uphold the Court of Appeals. First, the Court of Appeals 
explicitly acknowledged that Washington’s cruel punishment 
jurisprudence needs to evolve beyond the proportionality analysis under 
State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980), which is ill-suited to 
the inquiry of whether juvenile life without parole is ever constitutional. 
Rather than continue to rely on the Fain proportionality analysis, which is 
a test designed to examine idiosyncratic facts on a case-by-case basis 
rather than consider the constitutionality of an entire category of 
punishment as it relates to juveniles, the Court of Appeals adopted the 
categorical bar to establish that juvenile life without parole is never 
constitutional.  
Second, employing a Gunwall1 analysis as an interpretive tool to 
aid development of state constitutional jurisprudence, amici demonstrate 
that the Court of Appeals’ adoption of the categorical bar represents a 
                                                 
1 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 
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principled development of Washington’s cruel punishment jurisprudence.2 
A formal Gunwall analysis, although unnecessary, demonstrates that the 
categorical bar is the only meaningful way to ensure heightened protection 
against cruel punishment to juvenile offenders charged with homicide, and 
that this Court’s extension of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence beyond its 
formal holdings supports the explicit adoption of the categorical bar under 
article I, section 14. These, as well as other factors, compel this Court to 
uphold the categorical bar against juvenile life without parole. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY RECOGNIZED 
THAT A CATEGORICAL BAR ANALYSIS, RATHER 
THAN THE FAIN PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS, IS 
THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR ASSESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE.  
 
Fain’s proportionality test is neither the only nor the controlling 
cruel punishment analysis in Washington. Nor is the categorical bar an 
                                                 
2 In State v. Ramos, this Court declined to consider Mr. Ramos’s arguments 
about the constitutionality of juvenile life without parole (and juvenile life without parole 
equivalents) under article I, section 14, due to inadequate briefing. 187 Wn.2d 420, 453–
55, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), as amended (Feb. 22, 2017), reconsideration denied (Feb. 23, 
2017), cert. denied, No. 16-9363, 2017 WL 2342671 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017). Amici in 
Ramos requested this Court to consider a categorical bar against juvenile life without 
parole, but this Court similarly declined, because “they do not specifically analyze the 
factors we have established for determining whether a sentence violates the Washington 
Constitution.” Id. ¶ 61. Importantly, however, this Court did “not foreclose the possibility 
that [it] may reach a similar conclusion [that the Washington Constitution categorically 
bars juvenile life without parole] in a future case, but the briefing here does not 
adequately explain why we must do so as a matter of Washington constitutional law.” Id.  
Here, the propriety of the categorical bar is squarely presented by the Court of 
Appeals’ decision.  And, even though the Court of Appeals did not conduct a formal 
Gunwall analysis, it functionally considered the Gunwall factors—and amici here frame 
the Court of Appeal’s analysis into a formal Gunwall analysis.  
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analysis foreign to Washington that ignores binding precedent, as the State 
suggests. Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 15-17; Pet. for Rev. at 11–12. As the Court 
of Appeals correctly noted, both article I, section 14 and the Eighth 
Amendment have dual analyses, as they “proscribe[] disproportionate 
sentencing in addition to certain modes of punishment.” Bassett, 198 Wn. 
App. at 733 (quoting State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 676, 921 P.2d 
473 (1996) (emphasis added by Bassett court); see also Ramos, 187 
Wn.2d at 455 (declining to address the categorical bar on juvenile life 
without parole, but noting “[w]e do not foreclose the possibility that this 
court may reach [that] conclusion in a future case”).  
Fain proportionality analysis considers whether a particular 
punishment is disproportionate to the crime. 94 Wn.2d at 397–401. That 
four-factor test examines 1) the nature of the offense, 2) the legislative 
purpose behind the statute, 3) the punishment the defendant would have 
received in other jurisdictions for the same offense, and 4) the punishment 
meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction. Id.; cf. State v. 
Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 713, 921 P.2d 495 (1996) (replacing the second 
factor with “the legislative purpose behind the statute” when the test is 
used outside the habitual offender context). 
Proportionality analysis considers the crime and the sentence, but 
does not take into account the offender, as required by Miller. Miller v. 
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Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470–79, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 138 L. Ed. 2d 407 
(2012) (holding that mandatory juvenile life without parole violates the 
Eighth Amendment, and recognizing that juveniles have diminished 
culpability and greater prospects for reform). Consequently, courts must 
now consider the mitigating qualities of youth during sentencing. Id. at 
476–80. Thus, if Miller is to have any meaning, courts must consider a 
juvenile’s youth when determining the constitutionality of his or her 
sentence. Because Fain proportionality analysis does not allow for 
consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth, applying this analysis to 
juvenile life without parole sentences would violate Miller and the Eighth 
Amendment, in addition to article I, section 14.  
Washington courts are not constrained to Fain proportionality 
analysis if another analysis is more appropriate, as the categorical bar is 
here. In contrast to Fain proportionality analysis, a categorical bar analysis 
determines whether a particular punishment against a certain class of 
people is constitutionally barred given the nature of the offense or the 
characteristics of that class of offenders. State v. Schmeling, 191 Wn. App. 
795, 799, 365 P.3d 202 (2015). This two-step analysis considers 1) 
whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at 
issue, and 2) the independent judgement of the court, based on its 
precedent, as to whether the punishment is unconstitutional. See id. at 
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799–800. In “exercising independent judgment, we consider ‘the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question.’” 
Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 32 (quoting State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 
(Iowa 2014) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)).  
Thus, between the two tests, only the categorical bar analysis 
provides a workable, relevant test for determining whether juvenile life 
without parole sentences constitute cruel punishment because it allows for 
consideration of youth. The Court of Appeals neither “abandoned” nor is 
“bound” to Fain. Pet. for Rev. at 12, 15; see also Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 15 
(arguing that a cruel punishment claim “must proceed under the 
framework set out in Fain”). Rather, the Court of Appeals adopted a 
categorical bar analysis, recognized in Washington, that more effectively 
implements Miller’s central proposition that juveniles, as a class, are 
constitutionally different. Amici urge this Court to affirm the Court of 
Appeals’ adoption of a categorical bar against juvenile life without parole. 
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II. EVEN THOUGH A GUNWALL ANALYSIS IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14 IS MORE PROTECTIVE THAN THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE JUVENILE SENTENCING 
CONTEXT, THE GUNWALL FACTORS SUPPORT 
ADOPTION OF THE CATEGORICAL BAR AGAINST 
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE. 
 
Since this Court in Fain declared article I, section 14 to be more 
protective than the Eighth Amendment, 94 Wn.2d at 392–93, Washington 
courts have continued to so hold in a variety of sentencing contexts.3 Thus, 
                                                 
3 For persistent offender cases, see State v. Witherspoon, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 
888 (2014); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 674, 921 P.2d 473 (1996); State v. 
Rivers, 129 Wn.2d 697, 712, 921 P.2d 495 (1996); State v. Thorne, 129 Wn.2d 736, 772, 
921 P.2d 514 (1996). For death penalty cases, see State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, 506, 
14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 639, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). 
For consecutive sentences, see Wahleithner v. Thompson, 134 Wn. App. 931, 936, 143 
P.3d 321 (Div. I 2006). For cases indirectly supporting the conclusion that article I, 
section 14 provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment, see In re Rupe, 115 
Wn.2d 379, 396 n.5, 798 P.2d 780 (1990) (in the death penalty context, noting article I, 
section 14’s greater protection); In re Johnston, 99 Wn.2d 466, 478, 663 P.2d 457 (1983) 
(in a medical license denial case, citing Fain as an example of article I, section 14 
providing broader protection than the Eighth Amendment); State v. Grenning, 142 Wn. 
App. 518, 545–46, 174 P.3d 706 (Div. II 2008) (performing a Fain analysis in the 
consecutive and concurrent sentencing context to determine whether the sentence 
violated article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment); In re Haynes, 100 Wn. App. 
366, 375–76, 996 P.2d 637 (Div. I 2000) (in the exceptional sentencing context, 
indirectly affirming the proposition by performing a Fain analysis to determine whether 
the sentence violated both article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment).  
Immediately post-Fain, the Washington Court of Appeals inconsistently or 
improperly applied the Fain analysis, occasionally construing article I, section 14 as 
coextensive with the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 51 Wn. App. 42, 47–
48, 751 P.2d 1226 (1988) (equating proportionality analysis under article I, section 14 
with proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment); State v. Creekmore, 55 Wn. 
App. 852, 870–72, 783 P.2d 1068 (1989) (citing Bowen, 51 Wn. App. at 47) (stating that 
article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment are given essentially identical treatment). 
However, the clarity of this Court’s holdings in Manussier, Rivers, and Thorne cast doubt 
upon the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Bowen and Creekmore, and the Court of Appeals 
since Bowen and Creekmore has articulated article I, section 14’s heightened protection. 
State v. Hart, 188 Wn. App. 453, 461, 353 P.3d 253 (Div. III 2015); State v. Flores, 114 
Wn. App. 218, 223, 56 P.3d 622 (Div. I 2002); State v. Gimarelli, 105 Wn. App. 370, 
380, 20 P.3d 430 (Div. II 2001); State v. Morin, 100 Wn. App. 25, 29, 995 P.2d 113 (Div. 
I 2000); State v. Ames, 89 Wn. App. 702, 709 n.8, 950 P.2d 514 (Div. I 1998). 
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when article I, section 14 is invoked in a new context, the material inquiry 
is not whether the provision affords broader protection than the Eighth 
Amendment, but how the provision affords broader protection in this new 
context. See Blomstrom v. Tripp, __Wn.2d__, 402 P.3d 831, 842–43 
(2017) (noting that article I, section 7 provides more robust protection than 
the Fourth Amendment and then utilizing the Gunwall factors to establish 
the nature of the heightened protection in the new context of privacy rights 
of pretrial detainees). Therefore, a Gunwall analysis is not required to 
invoke the protection of article I, section 14. City of Woodinville v. 
Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 642, 211 P.3d 406 
(2009) (a Gunwall analysis is a helpful standard on briefing, not a doctrine 
controlling judicial decision-making).  
Nevertheless, the Gunwall factors are useful interpretive tools for 
defining the nature of the heightened protection against cruel punishment. 
See Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria Tests” in State 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 
37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1183 (2006). Amici provide a Gunwall analysis here 
to demonstrate that (1) a categorical bar against juvenile life without 
parole is a logical, necessary, and well-supported development in article I, 
section 14 jurisprudence, and (2) the Court of Appeals functionally 
analyzed many of the Gunwall factors even if it did not explicitly label its 
 9 
 
analysis according to the Gunwall rubric.4 See Cross Pet. for Rev. at 2 n.1; 
Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 9-11; Supp. Br. of Pet’r at 10-15. 
A. Factors One and Two: Plain Language and Differences 
Between Federal and State Provisions 
 
While Washington courts almost uniformly agree that article I, 
section 14 is more protective than the Eighth Amendment, supra note 3, 
they have not relied heavily on a textual analysis of the two constitutional 
provisions.  Nevertheless, the two provisions are textually different. Factor 
one considers the plain language of the statute, and factor two considers 
the differences between analogous federal and state constitutional 
provisions.  Washington’s cruel punishment clause reads “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment 
inflicted.” Const. art. I, § 14. The federal constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment is the analogous provision to article I, section 14 and reads 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII.    
Washington’s provision is similar to the Eighth Amendment, but 
lacks the words “and unusual.” This Court in State v. Dodd—one of the 
                                                 
4 The Gunwall factors are non-exclusive and include: 1) the textual language of the 
Washington constitution; 2) significant changes in the text of the Washington constitution 
and parallel federal provisions; 3) State Constitutional and common law history; 4) 
preexisting state law; 5) differences in structure between the state and federal 
constitution; and 6) matters of state interest or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d. at 61-
62.  
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few cases to analyze the textual factors in the article I, section 14 
context—notes the text of the state provision, banning all cruel 
punishment, is broader than the Eighth Amendment, which protects 
against punishment only if it was both cruel and unusual. 120 Wn.2d 1, 
21, 838 P.2d 86 (1992). The rest of the Gunwall analysis in Dodd is 
inapplicable to this case. See Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 11-13 (erroneously 
suggesting that this Court be guided by the Dodd court’s pronouncement 
that the Gunwall factors do not demand article I, section 14 to be 
interpreted more broadly than the Eighth Amendment).5  
B. Factor Three: Constitutional and Common Law History 
 
  The categorical bar is the only meaningful way to ensure 
heightened protection against cruel punishment to juvenile offenders 
charged with homicide. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
                                                 
5 The Court in Dodd determined that article I, section 14 did not extend greater protection 
than the Eighth Amendment within the narrow context of whether a capital defendant can 
waive general appellate review. 120 Wn.2d at 21; see also Manussier, 129 Wn.2d at 674 
n.89 (explicitly limiting Dodd as applicable only to its narrow context). When Dodd is 
considered alongside post-Dodd death penalty cases that hold article I, section 14 to be 
more protective, see, e.g., Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471, it is beyond dispute that Dodd and 
the few cases that rely on Dodd are outliers. See In re Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 731, 327 
P.3d 660 (2014) (quoting Dodd, 120 Wn.2d at 22) (dismissing Cross’s arguments that 
chapter 10.95 RCW violates article I, section 14 by relying on Dodd for the larger 
proposition that the Gunwall factors do not demand that article I, section 14 be 
interpreted more broadly than the Eighth Amendment); State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 
792, 168 P.3d 359 (2007) (citing Dodd, 120 Wn.2d at 22) (relying on Dodd’s statement 
that Gunwall factors do not demand that article I, section 14 be interpreted more broadly 
than the Eighth Amendment in dismissing Yates’ much broader argument that Chapter 
10.95 RCW is arbitrary and thus violates article I, section 14, when Dodd examined only 
whether article I, section 14 provided greater protection regarding waiver of appeal).  
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carefully analyzed article I, section 14 common law and determined that 
Fain’s proportionality test is ill-suited to analyzing whether juvenile life 
without parole is ever a constitutional punishment. As the Court of 
Appeals noted, the first Fain factor focuses on the characteristics of the 
crime, and not, as Miller requires, on the mitigating qualities that flow 
from the offender’s youth. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 738 (citing Fain, 94 
Wn.2d at 397-98). The Court of Appeals similarly noted that the fourth 
Fain factor, which considers the punishment meted out in other 
jurisdictions, conflicts with Miller because it “allows comparison with the 
punishment for adult offenders who commit the same crimes.” Id. 
(emphasis in original).  Because Fain does not properly consider youth, it 
cannot be the appropriate analysis.  
 Recognizing that Fain proportionality analysis would comply with 
neither the Eighth Amendment nor article I, section 14 in the juvenile life 
without parole context, the Court of Appeals had to “make an independent 
judgment of whether the punishment in question violates our State’s cruel 
punishment proscription.” Id. ¶ 57. The independent judgment of whether 
article I, section 14 categorically prohibits juvenile life without parole 
demands consideration of whether courts might be actually capable of 
considering the mitigating characteristics of youth as mandated by Miller 
and Montgomery.  
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The Court of Appeals was gravely concerned that sentencing 
courts would “misidentify[] juveniles with hope of rehabilitation for those 
who are irretrievably corrupt.” Bassett, 198 Wn. App.  ¶ 61. The “factors 
identified in Miller provide little guidance for a sentencing court and do 
not alleviate the unacceptable risk identified.” Id.  
[Consideration of] the offender’s family and home environment ... 
is ... fraught with risks. For example, what significance should a 
sentencing court attach to a juvenile offender's stable home 
environment? Would the fact that the adolescent offender failed to 
benefit from a comparatively positive home environment suggest 
he or she is irreparable and an unlikely candidate for 
rehabilitation? Or conversely, would the offender's experience with 
a stable home environment suggest that his or her character and 
personality have not been irreparably damaged and prospects for 
rehabilitation are therefore greater? ... 
 
A similar quandary faces courts sentencing juvenile offenders who 
have experienced horrendous abuse and neglect or otherwise have 
been deprived of a stable home environment. Should the offenders' 
resulting profound character deficits and deep-seated wounds 
count against the prospects for rehabilitation and in favor of life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole sentences under the Miller 
framework? Or should sentencing courts view the deprivation of a 
stable home environment as a contraindication for life without the 
possibility of parole because only time will tell whether maturation 
will come with age and treatment in a structured environment? 
 
Id. (quoting State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 838 (Iowa 2016)). Thus, the 
Court of Appeals recognized that only a categorical bar on juvenile life 
without parole could mitigate the risk that a juvenile whose crimes do not 
reflect “permanent incorrigibility,” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734, might 
be sentenced to die in prison. 
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C. Factor Four: Preexisting State Law  
 
Factor four considers whether “previously established bodies of 
state law…bear upon the granting of distinctive state constitutional 
rights.” Hugh D. Spitzer, Which Constitution? Eleven Years of Gunwall in 
Washington State, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1187, 1214 (1998). Preexisting 
Washington law has consistently extended greater consideration of the 
characteristics of youth in the sentencing context than is required by 
federal law. The Court of Appeals carefully examined this Court’s 
juvenile sentencing jurisprudence,6 consistent with the scope of the fourth 
Gunwall factor, and concluded that an “examination of our precedent 
illustrates that our Supreme Court has adopted and applied Miller's 
reasoning beyond its holding….Washington’s jurisprudence has embraced 
the reasoning of Miller, Roper, and Graham and has built upon it and 
extended its principles.” Bassett, 198 Wn. App. at 737 (internal citations 
omitted).  
This Court has consistently extended Miller’s “children are 
different” principles to protect juveniles in the sentencing context. In 
Ramos, this Court logically extended Miller to apply to de facto life 
                                                 
6 Because none of this Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions have been explicitly 
based on article I, section 14, this Court’s decisions are treated under factor 4 (preexisting 
state law), rather than factor 3 (common law interpreting the particular constitutional 
provision in question). 
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sentences because “[w]hether that sentence is for a single crime or an 
aggregated sentence for multiple crimes, we cannot ignore that the 
practical result is the same.” Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438; Bassett, 198 Wn. 
App. ¶ 45 (analyzing Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438).7 The Ramos court also 
explicitly acknowledged that Miller’s reasoning applies with equal force 
to multiple homicides as it does to single homicides: “[N]othing about 
Miller suggests its individualized sentencing requirement is limited to 
single homicides because ‘the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the 
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile 
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.’” Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 
438 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465) (emphasis added in Ramos); 
Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 45 (quoting Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438). 
In State v. O’Dell, this Court further extended Miller when it 
allowed the youth of an adult offender to be considered as a justification 
for departures below the standard sentencing range, in recognition that the 
juvenile brain is not fully developed by the age of eighteen. 183 Wn.2d 
680, 688–98, 358 P.3d 359 (2015); Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 46 
(discussing O’Dell). In State v. Houston-Sconiers, this Court expanded 
                                                 
7 Because this Court held previously in Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 438-39, that Washington 
courts must treat de facto juvenile life without parole sentences as they do actual life 
without parole sentences, it follows both naturally and necessarily that de facto juvenile 
life without parole sentences are also categorically barred. Amici urge this Court to so 
explicitly hold. 
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Miller even further when it declared that for courts to fully address the 
mitigating qualities of youth, courts need absolute discretion to depart 
from sentencing guidelines and any other mandatory sentencing 
enhancements when sentencing juveniles in adult court. 188 Wn.2d 1, 21, 
391 P.3d 409 (2017); Bassett, 198 Wn. App. ¶ 47 (discussing Houston-
Sconiers). 
 While neither Ramos, O’Dell, nor Houston-Sconiers was explicitly 
based on article I, section 14, this Court has demonstrated its commitment 
to expand Eighth Amendment jurisprudence beyond its formal holdings. 
Thus, even though this Court has not explicitly addressed how article I, 
section 14 is more protective in the juvenile sentencing context, it has 
fully embraced the precept that “children are constitutionally different” 
and acted to address the significant risks of applying adult sentencing 
procedures to juveniles. This Court’s extension of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence beyond its formal holdings supports the explicit adoption of 
the categorical bar under article I, section 14. 
D. Factor five: Structural Differences Between State and Federal 
Constitutions 
 
The fifth Gunwall factor always supports an independent state 
constitutional analysis because “the federal constitution is a grant of power 
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from the states, while the state constitution represents a limitation of the 
State’s power.” State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173, 180, 867 P.2d 593 (1994).  
E. Factor Six: Matters of State and Local Concern 
 
Factor six requires Washington courts to determine “whether the 
right claimed, in the context of the particular case before us, is a matter of 
such singular state interest or local concern that our constitution should be 
interpreted independently of the federal constitution.” State v. Foster, 135 
Wn.2d 441, 461, 957 P.2d 712 (1998). State criminal sentencing is a 
matter of local concern, as is the conduct of criminal trials generally. See 
State v. Smith, 150 Wn.2d 135, 152, 75 P.3d 934 (2003) (right to jury trial 
in criminal prosecution is a matter of local concern, rejecting State’s 
argument that the right to a jury trial is generally a concern to litigants 
nationally).  
CONCLUSION 
 
 Amici respectfully suggest that Mr. Bassett’s case is the 
appropriate moment to bar juvenile life without parole, given the careful 
analysis of the Court of Appeals and the robust briefing on state 
constitutional issues. More fundamentally, Mr. Bassett’s case gives this 
Court the opportunity to engage in principled development of 
Washington’s constitution, placing its juvenile justice jurisprudence 
soundly within our state constitution’s protection against cruel 
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punishment. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42, 103 S. Ct. 
3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). 
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